Our aim is to expand the regulative ideal governing consent. We argue that consent should not only be informed but also based on rational beliefs. We argue that holding true beliefs promotes autonomy. Information is important insofar as it helps a person to hold the relevant true beliefs. But in order to hold the relevant true beliefs, competent people must also think rationally. Insofar as information is important, rational deliberation is important. Just as physicians should aim to provide relevant information regarding the medical procedures prior to patients consenting to have those procedures, they should also assist patients to think more rationally. We distinguish between rational choice/action and rational belief. While autonomous choice need not necessarily be rational, it should be based on rational belief. The implication for the doctrine of informed consent and the practice of medicine is that, ifphysicians are to respect patient autonomy and help patients to choose and act more rationally, not only must they provide information, but they should care more about the theoretical rationality of their patients. They should not abandon their patients to irrationality. They should help their patients to deliberate more effectively and to care more about thinking rationally. We illustrate these arguments in the context of JYehovah's Witnesses refusing life-saving blood transfusions. Insofar as Jehovah's Witnesses should be informed of the consequences of their actions, they should also deliberate rationally about these consequences.
upon a competent patient unless that patient has consented to have that procedure, after having been provided with the relevant facts.
We have no quarrel with these principles. We do, however, question their interpretation and application. Our contention is that being autonomous requires that a person hold rational beliefs. We distinguish between rational choice and rational belief. Being autonomous may not require that one's choices and actions are rational. But it does require that one's beliefs which ground those choices are rational. If this is right, what passes for respecting autonomy sometimes consists of little more than providing information, and stops short of assessing whether this information is rationally processed. Some of what purports to be medical deference to a patient's values is not this at all: rather, it is acquiescence to irrationality. Some of what passes for respecting patient autonomy may turn out to be less respect than abandonment. Abandonment of patients has never been regarded as a morally admirable practice.
We will outline three ways in which patients hold irrational beliefs: (1) ignorance, (2) not caring enough about rational deliberation, and (3) making mistakes in deliberation. We argue that it is the responsibility of physicians not only to provide relevant information (which addresses 1), but to improve the rationality of belief that grounds consent (2 and 3 "... the life of the creature is the blood, and I appoint it to make expiation on the altar for yourselves: it is the blood, that is the life, that makes expiation".7
Jehovah's Witnesses believe these views concerning blood were important to the early Christian Church. At a meeting of the apostles and older men of Jerusalem to determine which laws would continue to be upheld in the new Church, blood was again proscribed:
"... you are to abstain from meat that has been offered to idols, from blood, from anything that has been strangled, and from fornication".8
Jehovah's Witnesses believe that these passages imply more than a dietary proscription. They attach great symbolic significance to blood: it represents the life or soul. Thus they claim that the exhortation "abstain from blood" applies to all forms of blood, at all times. They argue that there is no moral difference between sustaining life by taking blood by mouth ("eating blood") and taking blood directly into the veins.
Relative Most importantly of all, Arthur may not be very talented at theoretical reasoning. He may not be good at assembling the evidence and drawing conclusions from it. It is not enough for a person to throw up any explanation for evidence presented to him. To move from "I saw a light on the water" to "I saw a ghost at Dead Man's Bluff" is to make an unjustified and irrational leap. Ideally, we should infer to the best explanation. '6 Physicians, concerned to promote theoretical rationality, may assemble facts in a way which together suggest a conclusion. But patients may still fail to draw the right conclusion. Telling a patient that he has "advanced cancer" may imply that he will die. But the patient may not conclude this. Indeed, even telling a patient that he will die may not convey "the message" that the physician intends to give: perhaps that the patient ought to sort out his affairs, that he will not offer any more'curative treatments, and so on. Our object is the beliefs of JWs, not necessarily their choices. In some circumstances, JWs might autonomously choose to reject blood. We can autonomously adopt a course of action with a low probability of success, provided that we hold the relevant rational beliefs. Neither risk-takers nor the exceedingly cautious are necessarily nonautonomous, nor are they necessarily doing what there is good reason not to do. '7 IfJWs were to hold the relevant informed, rational beliefs, they might then autonomously choose to reject blood. But from their revised epistemic position, many would no doubt accept blood.
V Summary and implications
Where most rational agents differ from JWs is that they do not hold all of the following beliefs:
1. There is a God. 2. Divinely conferred immortality is possible for human beings after death. 3 . God forbids eating blood. 4 . Accepting a blood transfusion is no different from eating blood. If an ethic of respect for persons in contemporary medicine rules out -except in the most extreme cases -coercion as a response to patient irrationality, it also makes more imperative a "critical educator" response to patient irrationality. One caveat, however: effective educators know when to promote critical enquiry. Physicians, whose primary obligations are to the medical wellbeing of patients, will do well to resist the secondary obligation to promote rational criticism of deeply held beliefs at a time when their patients are impaired and suffering greatly. Thus the time to engage a hypothetically irrational JW in a critical enquiry about her convictions on "eating blood" is not the time at which she might benefit from an immediate blood transfusion because her life is in jeopardy.
It may be a very contemporary form of physician abandonment of patients in need to accept wilfulness as autonomy, the mere provision of information as adequate for informed consent 
